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Case No. 9345 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F~ U L 
EDITH CHLOE MATHIE, 
L E 
Plaintiff an.d Appellant, 
~~-- ---~----------- --------. ---- ... .,. -------------
~--~~::<~ ~~-::-:.·;-~me c~url·, L~.::~ 
vs. 
;(WILLIAM TRUMAN MATHIE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
HONORABLE JOSEPH G. JEPPSON, Judge 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS 
& MATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Pla1,ntiff 
.and Appellant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
.STATE OF UTAH 
EDITH CHLOE MATHIE, 
PlaintNf and Appellant) 
vs. 
WILLIAM TRUMAN MATHIE, 
Defendant rand Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9345 
Plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce from the 
defendant concerning which there is no issue raised by 
either party. This appeal questions the findings and con-
clusions with respect to the allocation and disposition 
of property and property interests, the objections to 
which are substantially delineated in the motion for new 
trial (R. 149-150), and as hereinafter more particularly 
referred to. 
The parties were married on February 28, 1946. The 
defendant is 53 years of age (R. 75), a former school 
teacher (R. 48) and at the time of the divorce was driv-
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ing a truck for a cleaning company for a gross salary of 
$60.00 a week (R. 76). The plaintiff, who is 52 years of 
age, has a background of Civil Service employment, em-
ployment as a waitress, cook, boarding house operator 
and teacher (R. 37-38). At the time of the divorce plain-
tiff was employed by the State Liquor Commission (R. 
36) at a gross salary of $260.00 a month (R. 51). Both 
parties have been previously married and divorced and 
both suffer from heart conditions (Ex. 1 and 2), the 
plaintiff's condition being organic since her birth (R. 36). 
The only substantial property involved is a home 
and adjacent apartment on South 7th East Street in Salt 
Lake City, considered as one unit, which was purchased 
for the total price of $13,500.00 in 1947. The initial down 
payment of $4,000.00 was made by plaintiff from funds 
accumulated by her prior to the marriage (R. 24, 61). 
Defendant has never made a payment on the property 
(R. 91) which has a present market value of $25,000.00 
(R. 104), but over the years contributed approximately 
$2,300.00 for remodeling (R. 142). Monthly payments on 
the purchase price and taxes were made hy the plaintiff 
fron1 her own funds or from the rent money. The last 
payment of $700.00 was made by plaintiff's daughter in 
October of 1949 (R. 25, 35, 40 and 48), whereupon plain-
tiff conveyed the property to her daughter (R. 35). 
A previous divorce action was commenced by the 
plaintiff in August of 1953 (R. 5). This action terminated 
in December of that year and the parties executed a re-
conciliation agreement (Ex. 2). By the agreement of 
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December 5, 1953, the defendant acknowledges plaintiff's 
ownership in the property and the plaintiff agreed to 
execute a Will granting to defendant a life estate to the 
property in the event of her prior death. The "\Vill was 
duly executed (Ex. 4). 
The decree awards possession of the portion of the 
property occupied as a home to plaintiff and awards pos-
session of the rental units to defendant with the right to 
evict the plaintiff as a tenant unless he is paid the same 
rental as would be required from a stranger. The horne 
and the rental units are required to be held in trust "for 
equitable distribution" of expenses and income beginning 
as of June 23, 1960 ''and the parties shall pro-rate all of 
the utilities, and rents due and that the income and ex-
penses be enjoyed and borne fifty percent by each party." 
The decree then provides that the property can only be 
sold by the mutual consent of the parties (R. 147), in 
which event one-half of the sale price shall be divided 
after plaintiff has received $2,500.00 therefrom "and, 
in the event the said real property is not sold, then at the 
death of the defendant, plaintiff & defendant having 
used the premises for their living expenses and normal 
pursuits in life, the property be distributed to the plain-
tiff, her heirs devisees & legatees." (R. 148). 
Since the decree Coy Moore, plaintiff's daughter, 
and her daughter's husband have reconveyed the pro-
perty to plaintiff. 
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STATE!1:ENTS OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE 
COURT AWARDING TO DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN 
THE APARTMENT AND HOME GREATER THAN THAT 
PROVIDED IN THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
POINT II. THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY 
IS SO INEQUITABLE AND UN JUST THAT IT MANIFESTS 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND 
SHOULD BE CORRECTED. 
POINT III. THE COURT.'S DECREE IS UNCERTAIN, 
AMBIGUOUS AND INEQUITABLE. 
ARGUJ\fENT 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE 
COURT AWARDING TO DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN 
THE APARTMENT AND HOME GREATER THAN THAT 
PROVIDED IN 'THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT ARE 
CONTRARY TO 'THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
The reconciliation agreement of the 5th day of De-
cember, 1953, gives plaintiff the beneficial ownership 
of the property during her lifetime. The agreement is a 
valid and binding contract which the court cannot alter, 
amend or modify to the detriment of either party. An-
notation, 11 A.L.R. 277. 
In the case of Levine v. Levine (Ga. 1948), 4 A.L.R. 
2d 1205, 49 S.E. 2d 814, plaintiff separated from defend-
ant because of his cruel treatment and thereafter a rec-
onciliation occurred. The defendant executed a deed for 
the consideration of the plaintiff, his wife, becoming rec-
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onciled and returning to live with him. Subsequently 
plaintiff cominenced a suit for divorce at which time de-
fendant claimed that plaintiff by her present suit had 
elected to rescind the reconciliation contract and that the 
deed should be cancelled. The trial court held in favor 
of defendent and ordered the plaintiff as a condition of 
trying her case on its merits to reconvey the property to 
the defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff had paid and satisfied in full any considera-
tion requiring her to become reconciled and return to 
her husband and that by virtue of the deed she was the 
owner absolute of the title conveyed. The court states : 
"It would be a novel legal principle that would 
compel this wife to suffer his breach o;r else, as a 
penalty for seeking redress, surrender that which 
he had freely given as an inducement for her re-
turn to him." 
The valid and binding effect of reconciliation agreements 
is also recognized in the following cases: Campbell v. 
Prater (Wyo. 1948), 191 P. 2d 160; Tyson V. Tyson 
(Ariz. 1944), 149 P. 2d 674; Bowden v. Bowden (CaL 
1917), 167 P. 154; Schwab v. Schwab (Cal. 1959), 335 
P.2d 174. 
The trial court in the instant case, by its oral find-
ings and again in its written findings, acknowledges the 
existence of the agreement and then proceeds to erron-
eously interpret the agreement to the prejudice of plain-
tiff. The agreement gives to the defendant a life estate 
to take effect upon the death of plaintiff. To give to the 
defendant a greater interest in the property than he has 
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under the agreement would be to compel plaintiff to suf-
fer defendant's breach, or else, as a penalty for seeking 
redress, surrender that which defendent had freely given 
as an inducement for plaintiff returning to him. The 
plaintiff under the agreement became the absolute owner 
of the property, subject only to a life estate in the event 
she predeceases the defendant. 
The court by awarding to defendant a present in-
terest in the home and apartment house rewrites the 
agreement of the parties of DecerDber 5, 1953, contrary 
to the evidence and the law. 
POINT II. THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY 
IS SO INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST THAT rr MANIFESTS 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND 
SHOULD BE CORRECTED. 
The findings of fact and decree relating to the home 
and apartment house, together with the court's com-
ments, evidence considerable vindictiveness. Upon learn-
ing of the deed given by plaintiff to her daughter for a 
consideration of $700.00, which conveyance is not condon-
ed and has since been corrected, the trial Judge lost sight 
of the equities as is disclosed by the following quotations 
from the record : 
"THE COURT: Mr. Reid, I think this pro-
perty ought to be conveyed back into her name, so 
it can be adjudicated. 
I think the conveyance was not honest. She 
apparently let it go for $700. She cannot dissipate 
money or property in the hands of the court to 
distribute. 
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* * * 
THE COURT: You think that over between 
now and two. The Court would like possession of 
that property in order to properly decide this 
case." (R. 118). 
1
' THE C01JRT * * * 
She has a bank account at this time, and the 
distribution of that account is she may have that 
account. However, the plaintiff is restrained from 
now, in drawing anything from that account until 
the title to the real estate is cleared up, and the 
cloud placed upon it by the deed from the plaintiff 
to her daughter. 
The Court construes this as a method of try-
ing to conceal the property and get it out of the 
reach of the court, and it is improper conduct on 
the part of the plaintiff and her daughter in mak-
ing this transaction. 
As part of the security to protect the defend-
ant in getting the title cleared up, this bank ac-
count that has been described in the sum of about 
$50.00 is ordered left intact, so that if the defend-
ant needs to, he may levy upon it and use it for 
the purp·ose of clearing the title to the property. 
* * * 
The Court awards to the plaintiff attorneys 
fees. The attorneys fees have been described as 
being worth $500, and they may be. The Court 
does not have to pass on that subject, but IT IS 
ORDERED that the defendant pay his own fees, 
that he also pay to the plaintiff $300 to assist the 
plaintiff in paying her fees. The defendant need 
not make this payment of $300 until after the title 
to the property is cleared up from the cloud that 
the court has heretofore referred to. 
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* * * 
The Court is of the opinion that the deed to 
the daughter is a nullity, except that it amounts 
to a cloud that has to be cleared up either by the 
consent of the plaintiff, which may be done with-
out cost, or by the action of Court, at her ex-
pense." (R. 121-122) 
"IT. IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ex-
penses of the defendant that will be incurred and 
necessary in quieting title to this property from 
the cloud in the nature of a deed given by the 
plaintiff to her daughter, should be horne by the 
plaintiff; that includes court costs, attorneys's 
fees, abstracting, and any necessary expense to-
ward the clearing of that title." (R. 123.) 
"THE COURT I am going to leave that with 
a life interest. She tried to steal that from him." 
(R. 133). 
From reading the foregoing statements of the trial 
court it becomes apparent that the court was following 
a course of conduct similar to that condemned in the case 
of Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144, 
wherein it was said that the trial court in part attempted 
to compensate the plaintiff for "her suffering of the 
pangs of unrequited love - heart balm - and teach Mr. 
Foreman a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly 
within the issues of a divorce case such as this." This 
court in the Foreman case stated: 
''In the case at bar the reasons the judge re-
cited in open court for his decision are not con-
sistent with his findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and decree. They cast doubt upon the founda-
tion for those determinations. It is a simple mat-
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ter to recite or write sufficient facts to support 
a decision once the decision is made, but the trial 
court's process of determination to be a proper 
exercise of judgment for founding a question 
upon the merits should show an attempt to decide 
the issues of the case as presented, and should not 
be founded upon extraneous matters." 
In the case of Wilson v. Wi!lson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 
P.2d 977, this court comments on punitive measures in 
a divorce judgment and states as follows: 
"We recognize that there is no authority in 
our law for administering punitive measures in a 
divorce judgment, and that to do so would be 
improper, * * * " 
In the instant matter the court imposes vindictive 
punishment upon plaintiff because of the ill-advised con-
veyance given by plaintiff to her daughter. Such conduct 
is not properly within the issues of this case. The reasons 
of the Judge cited in open court for his decision cast 
doubt upon the foundation for his determination. The 
trial court's process of determination, to he a proper 
exercise of judgment for deciding a question upon the 
merits, should show an attempt to decide the issues of the 
case as presented and not upon extraneous matters. 
Foreman v. Foreman, supra. 
Since divorce proceedings are equitable actions, the 
parties are entitled to the judgment of this court as well 
as that of the trial court. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 
157, 292 P. 214. Where there exists an unjust distribu-
tion of the property as exists in this matter, the Supreme 
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Court should review the evidence and substitute its judg-
ment for that of the trial court. M.artinette v. Martimette, 
8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P .2d 821. 
Within the guideposts set out in MacDonald v. Mac~ 
Donald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 10G6, the plaintiff should 
have been awarded the entire interest in the home and 
rental units, assuming that the court will not, as a matter 
of public policy, adopt the rule applied in other jurisdic-
tions to the reconciliation agreement. In the instant case 
there has been no community of interest, each party liv-
ing substantially on their respective earnings. The real 
estate was acquired by the separate property of the 
plaintiff and the contributions that the defendant has 
made for remodeling, totaling some $2,300.00 over a 
period of approximately thirteen years, is less than the 
equivalent of rental for his occupancy. 
POINT III. THE COURT'S DECREE IS UNCERTAIN, 
AMBIGUOUS AND INEQUITABLE. 
An examination of the record in the instant matter 
discloses that the trial court intended to give defendant 
no more than he acquired under the agreement of De-
cember 5, 1953 (Ex. 2). In the court's oral findings the 
court states: 
"The Court is mindful of the agreement the 
parties entered into when they reunited after 
their last complaint was filed in the previous case. 
The defendant has not lost any rights that he may 
have acquired or had in that agreement." (R.120). 
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The court did not intend to grant to the defendant a 
permanent interest in the home .and apartment house, 
but intended to create only a semblance of control until 
such time as plaintiff secured a deed of conveyance re-
conveying the property from plaintiff's daughter. Dur-
ing the argument on the Inotion for a new trial attention 
was called to the fact that there was nothing in the find-
ings with respect to an obligation to pay rent for the 
use of the home as distinguished from the rental units 
(R. 127), and yet in paragraph 9 of the decree (R. 147) 
the home and the rental units are "in trust'' for an equit-
able distribution of income. As to this the court said: 
"I cannot remember that provision, but read-
ing it now, it looks like it was merely an arrange-
ment so they could get together on what you might 
call 'a closing statement for a real estate sale.' 
They have some expenses and income to pro 
rate. For example, a tenant may have paid her 
the rent in June for the period which was awarded 
to him, and she may have paid some expenses in 
advance, so they would have to pro rate it. 
All it would take is for somebody to get to-
gether and say, 'As of this date· you owe the pro 
rata expenses' and that ought to settle any-liabil-
ity on the property, save that settlement. The ef-
fort was to hold a string on the· property until 
they made a clean separation as of the date spec-
ified, June 23rd." (R. 127). 
Attention was then called to the retention of the use of the 
bank account, the restraint on the payment of attorneys' 
fees until plaintiff had cleared the title to the property 
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and the right of the defendant to evict the plaintiff from 
the rental units. The court then made the comment: "The 
house was awarded to her." (R. 128). 
Paragraph 9 of the decree was again called to the 
court's attention and the court made the observation: 
"That is just to make a settlement." (R.128). 
To compound the confusion the court attributed to 
the decree the intention to give plaintiff the home free 
and clear after unspecified and undetermined reimburse-
ments had been made as of June 23, 1960 (R. 129). 
The fact of the matter is that the decree remains 
ambiguous and uncertain and, as pointed out above, 
makes an inequitable allocation and distribution of the 
property. The lip service on the subject of sale is unreal-
istic and unworkable, requiring two estranged people to 
join therein and, in the absence of their mutual consent, 
permits the defendant to dissipate all substantial rental 
for upkeep and repairs at his sole election. The plaintiff, 
notwithstanding her grievances against the defendant 
justifying a divorce in her favor, has, to all intents and 
purposes, been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoy-
n1ent of property acquired by. her sole and separate 
rneans. At pretrial her right to alimony was waived (R. 
11), thus making her reliance upon her own resources 
and accumulations of controlling importance. The in-
equities are apparent. 
The transcript of the argument on the motion for a 
new trial (R. 124-136) reveals the confusion on the part 
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of the court not only as to the record but, what is more 
important, as to the meaning and the intent of the decree 
and the findings to support it, the guideposts by which 
the parties are to be directed. After the court had attem-
pted to correct certain facets of the decree by interlinea-
tion and had resolved the remaining objections against 
plaintiff and after the matter was effectively brought to 
an end short of an appeal by the denial of the motion for 
new trial, the court said : 
"The Court asks counsel to get together and 
just discuss it, and if an ambiguity, to see if you 
can work it out, and stipulate to cure it, within 
the ~ntention of the Court." (R. 136). 
While there is much to be said in favor of the in-
novations afforded by our Rules of Civil Procedure to 
expedite and terminate litigation, we respectfully suggest 
that our procedures are not yet mellowed to the point 
where a court can effectively delegate to the attorneys 
in adversary proceedings the task indicated above. We 
submit that it is still the function of the court to resolve 
the issue and not to leave to the partisan views of counsel 
the impossible task of determining what might be ''with-
in the intention of the Court," particularly after the 
Judge has terminated his role and turned his attention 
to other matters. 
CONCLUSION 
The property rights are of extreme importance to 
the parties in the instant case. There is nothing in the 
record that justifies a property award to the defendant. 
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The decree should be corrected by this Court, or the 
judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded 
with such instructions as to this Court may seem agree-
able to the equitable considerations of the position of the 
respective parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTS SON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
